> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.contributionism.io/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.contributionism.io/choosing-an-organisational-design/consumer-and-donor-governed-organisations.md). # Consumer and donor governed organisations Some organisations may appropriately give consumers or donors a substantial role in governance. These arrangements should be evaluated according to their purpose, participation structure and decision-making responsibilities. They should not be assumed to require every consumer or donor to vote on every operational matter. ## **Consumer governance** Consumer governance gives users or purchasers influence over an organisation that provides goods or services to them. It may be suitable where consumers have a strong shared interest in: * Reliable access. * Fair prices. * Service quality. * Local availability. * Protection against exploitation. * Long-term continuity. Examples can include consumer cooperatives, mutual services and community facilities. The relevant relationship may be membership rather than the value of each purchase. ## **Consumer voting eligibility** An organisation might establish eligibility through: * Active membership. * Recent use of a service. * A minimum purchasing threshold. * Residence within a service area. * Another relevant participation condition. A spending-based voting system gives greater influence to larger purchasers. That may align with some financial exposure, but it can also concentrate power among wealthier consumers. One member, one vote provides a different balance. It recognises equal membership standing rather than proportional spending. The choice should follow the organisation’s purpose. ## **Donor governance** Donor governance gives people who provide donations influence over relevant organisational decisions. Possible responsibilities include: * Selecting among eligible projects. * Advising on funding priorities. * Electing representatives. * Reviewing reports on how funds were used. Donor involvement can increase trust and engagement. However, donations do not automatically justify general ownership or control. Charitable and other restricted assets may be subject to legal duties that cannot be displaced by donor preferences. ## **Protecting recipients** A donor-governed organisation can become overly responsive to the preferences of those supplying funds rather than those needing assistance. For example, donors may favour projects that are highly visible, easy to explain or personally appealing. Recipients may need services that are less visible or more difficult to evaluate. A suitable arrangement may therefore include: * Recipient representation. * Independent expertise. * A protected organisational mission. * Restrictions on donor interference in individual cases. The ability to donate more does not automatically determine whose needs will be considered the most important. ## **Participation and scale** Consumers and donors may have limited time or interest in governance. This is a genuine design concern, but it does not make large-scale participation impossible. Representative elections, specialist committees, delegated authority and clear divisions of responsibility can reduce the burden. The important questions are: * Which decisions require broad participation? * Which can be delegated? * How are representatives held accountable? * How are inactive members prevented from being misrepresented? * How are organised minorities prevented from capturing low-participation processes? These questions also arise in worker and shareholder governance. ## **Relationship with workers** Consumers and donors should not necessarily determine daily working methods. Workers often have greater operational knowledge and should have appropriate authority over their responsibilities and working conditions. A consumer-governed organisation can therefore delegate operations to workers while retaining member authority over service priorities and leadership selection. Similarly, donors might influence programme priorities without determining individual staff schedules. ## **Maintaining current eligibility** Where governance is intended to reflect recent participation, the organisation should state how eligibility is renewed and when it ends. Any renewal process should be accessible and should not create unnecessary barriers for vulnerable users or small donors. The expiry of voting eligibility should also be distinguished from continuing rights under existing contracts or donation restrictions.